ABSTRACT Cloud storage provides an inexpensive and effective means for the storage and management of images, which in turn occupy a huge proportion and are usually stored in an archived mode. Considering the security and efficiency requirements of cloud images, an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme is in urgent need. However, existing solutions cannot be directly applied since they do not take the characteristics of cloud images into account and thus take enormous computations, communications, and storage to generate, transfer, and store authentication data. Moreover, the result of auditing cannot be used as evidence to prove the guilt of cloud service provider since the verifier whom is specified by the client may hide its misbehavior. Reversible watermarking is a potential way to achieve lightweight real-time audit for cloud images without introducing permanent distortion. Nevertheless, existing algorithms cannot provide stable capacity for authentication data of fixed length. In addition, it entails security problems once it is used to solve the fairness problem. This paper proposes an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme specific to cloud images with fair arbitration support. The scheme is based on the presented adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm which provides a fixed embedding capacity for images to embed authentication data. To address fairness problem under the proposed mechanism, we adopt Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme to design a new challenge-response protocol under the established simplified consensus mechanism, so that replay attack resistance and privacy-preserving fair arbitration are achieved. The security analysis and performance evaluation show that the proposed scheme has provable security and greatly enhanced efficiency comparing with the state of the art.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of Internet and multimedia technologies, cloud storage systems have gradually become the mainstream of storage methods for digital images. In a variety of fields, an increasing number of images are stored in this way on the ground that such a manner greatly reduces the cost of both storage and management, and improves access
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Biju Issac. efficiency simultaneously. However, due to the untrusted nature of cloud storage, images are suffering from the risk of been manipulated or corrupted. Unlike other types of cloud data, images occupy a huge proportion in cloud storage and are usually stored in an archived mode. Thus it is unrealistic to apply existing integrity audit schemes directly since they are designed for generalized types of data and none of them considered the characteristics of images adaptively.
Specifically, integrity audit schemes can be divided into epoch-based schemes [1] - [11] and real-time ones [12] .
For an epoch-based scheme, the integrity checking happens every time at the end of a time interval of fixed length, while for a real-time one, data has to be checked once it is downloaded and about to be used. Most of the existing researches belong to the first category. Although they have been demonstrated to be practical, they are suffering from security and efficiency problems. Firstly, data corruption can only be detected at the end of an epoch rather than at the download time [12] in these schemes. They do not apply to cloud images which are sensitive to content modification since it cannot always be detected instantly. Consider a cloud storage system to store scanned images of bank receipt. For the customer of cloud storage service -the bank, the amount information on the scanned receipt counts for a great deal. Due to monetary reasons, however, this important information is confronted with the risk of being manipulated by the CSP, which brings about the bank serious potential security menace if the manipulation cannot be detected immediately. Secondly, periodical checking is expensive on account that each data needs multiple rounds of checking even if it is not used. For archived cloud images which may not be used frequently, the overhead is redundant and avoidable. Real-time auditing overcomes these limitations by choosing the right time to check the integrity of cloud data. However, this kind of work still faces the problem of inefficiency. During the process of auditing, the great deal of communication overhead for authentication data which is closely related to the huge amount of cloud images will no doubt affect the real-time performance. Such kinds of security threat and inefficiency problem motivate us to study a lightweight real-time integrity audit scheme specific to cloud images, in which the audit time must be short enough compared with the time it takes to open the image.
Once the result of real-time audit shows that images of clients are tampered, corrupted or lost in cloud storage, it is necessary for them to prove the guilt of CSP. Also, CSP should have ability to check the correctness of received images to prevent clients from falsely charging at a later time. A common solution is to introduce a third party arbitrator (TPAR) designated by both the client and CSP jointly [10] , [13] . However, to avoid repeatedly generating authentication information, the arbitration mechanism is tightly associated with the selected integrity audit scheme, which makes none of the existing ones available here. In addition, considering the performance requirements, the arbitration scheme should not introduce additional overhead to the process of real-time auditing. Thus we will design a novel arbitration mechanism specific to cloud images which is sufficiently simplified to ensure performance. Takes the security into account, the scheme under study should be able to protect the privacy of cloud images from leaking to TPAR, and get rid of replay attack launched by either the client or the CSP.
Therefore, in this paper, we are going to tackle how to enable an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme for cloud images with privacy-preserving fair arbitration support. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to achieve both functionalities specific to images in cloud storage. Take the characteristics of images into account, our scheme surpasses existing ones in security and efficiency. Specifically, we utilize the technique of reversible watermarking [14] , [15] , which enables the client to embed authentication information into images before outsourcing to cloud storage and thus both the extra communication and storage overhead of authentication information will be completely eliminated. Thus during the process of real-time auditing, the client does not need to download authentication data independently any more. Moreover, with the help of the proposed reversible watermarking algorithm, authentication data with fixed length could always be embedded and once the watermark is extracted, the original images would be recovered without any modification. Another advantage of this manner is that authentication based on invisible watermarking is less obvious than traditional schemes. On the other hand, to deal with the fairness problem under the proposed real-time audit scheme and ensure the performance of auditing, we adopt Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme to design a new challenge-response protocol under the established simplified consensus mechanism. The proposed protocol achieves replay attack resistance against the prover and privacy-preserving guarantee during the arbitration process. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as the following four aspects:
1. We motivate the real-time auditing and fair arbitration system of image storage security in cloud computing, and propose a specific system model to support lightweight auditing and privacy-preserving arbitration. Furthermore, concrete protocols for both of them are presented respectively.
2. We propose an adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm with fixed embedding capacity for real-time audit scenario in cloud storage. Thus authentication data of constant length is able to be embedded into equally sized image blocks, regardless of the content. With the help of reversible watermarking, minor calculation as well as completely eliminated communication and storage overhead for authentication information are achieved simultaneously during real-time auditing and lightweight audit is achieved. In addition, the image would be recovered to the original state once the watermark is extracted thus the availability will not be affected.
3. We present a novel fair arbitration scheme under the reversible watermarking based real-time integrity audit mechanism. In particular, we design a new challenge-response protocol under the established simplified consensus mechanism and achieves resistance against replay attack as well as privacy leakage by introducing Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme during the process of arbitration.
4. We prove the security of our scheme and verify its effectiveness by experiments and comparisons with the state of the art.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the related work and Section III introduces the system model, threat model and design goals.
Section IV presents an adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm, followed by an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme for cloud images and a privacy-preserving arbitration protocol. Further, we present security analysis and performance evaluation in Section V and Section VI, respectively. And Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, growing interest has been focused on the topic of integrity verification in cloud storage. Deswarte et al. [16] were the first to achieve integrity checking of files stored on remote servers based on challenge-response protocols. In their scheme, a checksum is precomputed and stored on the verifier for each file to be verified and the challenge is generated randomly. Such scheme is only a preliminary exploration to solve the problem of integrity verification and is not applying to massive amount of data in cloud storage since it does not take the storage overhead of verifier into account. As a follow-up work, Ateniese et al. [1] introduced a model for provable data possession (PDP), which for the first time put forward the notion of RSA-based homomorphic verifiable tags for blocks. In their scheme, tags are outsourced to remote servers for storage together with blocks and local storage of the verifier is relieved. However, due to the property of RSA signatures they adopted, the tags are at least 1024 bits long for security, which costs too much communication overhead and storage overhead for CSP if the scheme is used in cloud storage scenario. Besides, their scheme is not privacy preserving when the verifier is a third party entity. As an improvement, Shacham and Waters [17] used BLS signatures [18] instead of RSA signatures to generate authentication value whose length is restricted to 160 bits. At the same time, the security is ensured in the random oracle model. Wang et al. [2] were the first ones who consider privacy-preserving public auditing for secure cloud storage. They proposed a mechanism which uniquely integrates homomorphic linear authentication with random masking technique. In their design, the linear combination of sampled blocks in the server's response is masked with randomness generated by a server, thus the TPA no longer has all the necessary information to derive the client's data content. Based on their work, many other schemes [3] - [9] , [19] , [20] were proposed to support integrity audit in cloud storage. Erway et al. [4] extended the PDP model to support provable updates to the stored data by presenting a rank-based authenticated dictionary built over a skip list. To improve the efficiency, Wang et al. [3] manipulated the classic Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) construction for block tag verification. Tian et al. [5] presented a new two-dimensional data structure named dynamic hash table located at the TPA to record the data property information for dynamic auditing. One step further, Yang and Jia [6] extended the data dynamic verification scheme to multiple owners scenario. Zhu et al. [7] and Wang [8] introduced PDP scheme into multi-cloud storage and Liu et al. [9] and Peng et al. [19] developed integrity audit in multi-replica scenario. Take data sharing into account, Shen et al. [20] proposed an identity-based shared data integrity auditing scheme with sensitive information hiding. However, all of the schemes introduced above are epoch-based auditing, which means the outsourced data is verified periodically by the verifier, thus the tampering or corruption can only be detected at the end of each epoch. Besides, in these works, no scheme guarantees the CSP to recognize the accusing by the client once the result of audit is false, since the verifier is either the client itself or the third party auditor specified by the client, rather than a third party authority trusted by both sides.
These problems motivate the developing of real-time integrity audit and fair arbitration schemes in cloud storage. Hwang and Chen [12] developed a file oriented real-time audit scheme for cloud storage systems, in which the auditing is performed when each file operation is executed. They presented a new data structure called FBHTree (Full Binary Hash Tree) maintained by the CSP to store the hash values of files which are used as authentication information. In their scheme, whenever the client makes a file operation, it requests a slice of FBHTree which contains the hash value of the file. With the help of this slice, the client is able to verify whether the file is correct. This scheme, however, suffers from severe efficiency problems. Since the client verifies the correctness of the received file by hash value comparison, it has to keep the latest root hash value of the FBHTree and check the root hash of the received slice every time it downloads a file. The computation overhead of clients increases sharply with depth increment of FBHTree. Jin et al. [10] and Küpçü et al. [13] extended the existing threat models to assume both clients and CSP have the motive to cheat and introduce a third party arbitrator to achieve fair arbitration. Their work is based on the signature exchange idea in which the exchanged signatures imply an agreement has been reached on the metadata by the two parties and are necessary for later dispute resolution. However, to achieve signature exchange, both the client and CSP has to verify each other's signatures, which greatly limits the efficiency. In addition, in all existing schemes, tampering localization is not supported so that the client is not able to find out which part of the data is corrupted in time.
Reversible watermarking is an ideal technique to deal with the problems encountered above. By utilizing the feature of images, it allows the client to embed the authentication watermark into an image in such a way that the original image can be reconstructed from the watermarked one [14] , [21] , [22] . A fundamental principle in the design of reversible watermarking algorithm is to prevent possible overflow/underflow while at the same time achieve reversibility. Honsinger et al. [23] were the first to propose a reversible watermarking algorithm satisfies the requirements list above. The algorithm is carried out in spatial domain, it achieves overflow/underflow prevention by making use of modulo 256 addition to embed watermark for authentication. However, it suffers from annoying salt and pepper noise due to possible grayscale value flipping over between 0 and 255 in either direction during the modulo 256 addition [15] . Also, the embedding capacity of the above algorithms is limited. As an improvement, Tian [24] proposed a Difference Expansion modulation based algorithm, which calculates the differences of neighboring pixel values, and select some difference values for the difference expansion (DE) to embed watermark. By restricting the difference value to a fixed range, overflow and underflow problems are prevented. As another solution, Ni et al. [15] proposed a Histogram Shifting modulation based algorithm. Histogram Shifting (HS) shifts a range of image histogram to create a 'gap' next to the histogram maxima. Pixels that belong to the histogram maxima are shifted to the gap or stay unchanged to embed watermark bit ''1'' or ''0''. To reduce the distortion, Kim et al. [25] improved the work by using two prediction values to create two skewed histograms, thus reducing the number of shifted pixels. A step further, Pan et al. [26] extended it to transform domain. Coatrieux et al. [27] exploited an image classification process to identify the areas of the image which are most locally appropriate watermarking modulation, and then embed watermark by histogram shifting. However, almost all of the introduced works need to generate and embed auxiliary authentication information into the limited capacity, which brings about non-negligible extra overhead. In other related work, Thodi and Rodriguez [28] proposed a prediction error expansion (PEE) based method, in which the difference between the pixel and its prediction is expanded for data embedding. It is derived from DE and HS based methods but superior to both of them in performance since the obtained prediction error histogram (PEH) is more sharply distributed. Coltuc [29] splited the difference between the current pixel and its prediction context to generate an increase of prediction errors. Ou et al. [30] considered every two adjacent prediction-errors jointly to generate a sequence consisting of prediction-error pairs. Then based on the sequence and the PEH, they design a new scheme named pairwise PEE to enhance the imperceptibility. As a further improvement, Dragoi and Coltuc [31] proposed an adaptive pixel pairing that considers only pixels with similar prediction errors. Wu et al. [32] presented an ensemble data embedding strategy to further improve the rate-distortion performance. Beside the aforementioned problem, while all the above schemes provide methods for reversible watermarking, none of them is able to provide stable capacity to embed authentication data so that we cannot use them directly in our scenario. In addition, once the authentication process is extended to a challenge-response manner, the replay attack launches by the prover cannot be resisted and the privacy of images to be checked is exposed to the risk of being leaked.
Portions of the work presented in this paper have previously appeared as an extended abstract in [33] . We employ the method of [33] to solve the replay attack problem and extend the paper to a more applicable scenario with many technical details improved. The primary improvements are as follows: First, we provide a new system model which supports lightweight real-time integrity auditing and privacy preserving arbitration in Section III.A. Also, we include additional security threats under this system model in Section III.B. Second, based on the enhanced system model, we provide a new reversible watermarking based real-time integrity auditing protocol in Section IV.C. For completeness, we also include a new adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm in Section IV.A to fit the requirement of real-time audit scenario in cloud storage. Third, we extend our main scheme to support privacy preserving arbitration in Section IV.C, and provide discussions on why to choose BLS short signatures as well as how to design the challenge response protocol for privacy preserving arbitration in Section IV.D, which are lack in [33] . Finally, we completely redo all the experiments in performance evaluation in Section VI.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model illustrated in Fig. 1 contains three entities: the client, the CSP and the TPAR, respectively. The first party is an entity who has plenty of images to outsource. It could be a smartphone or an ipad whose bandwidth and storage capacity are limited. Also, it may be a bank or hospital who cares more about the security of its outsourced images. An example is given in the previous section. In general, the client is reluctant to leak the privacy of its images to any other third party besides the CSP. The second party is an entity who manages multiple cloud storage servers to provide vast amount of storage resources to clients cooperatively. It guarantees a certain level of storage service quality by signing an SLA with the client. The third party is an entity who is expert in dispute arbitration and appointed by both the client and the CSP. It is able to handle concurrent task requests since it has enough computational capabilities and storage capacities. Cloud clients buy or lease storage services from the CSP in a pay-as-you-go manner. They generate watermark and embed into their images before outsourcing to CSP for storage. Once the CSP receives the watermarked image, it first checks whether the watermark is correctly generated based on the content of the image. If so, it stores the image locally and notifies the cloud client to delete its local copy. Otherwise, it may resort to TPAR for arbitration. Additionally, every time the client downloads its images from the CSP and about to open, it also checks whether they are tampered or corrupted, if the answer is no, the client begins to use the downloaded images without doubt; otherwise, it contacts TPAR for arbitration. The TPAR is able to settle the disputes fairly and return the results to both sides.
B. THREAT MODEL
It is clear from the system model that once clients outsource images to cloud for storage, it is actually depriving their physical control. The CSP manages a large amount of storage resources but it is not always reliable to provide storage service to clients. To the outsourced images, data integrity threats come from a variety of factors, such as the failures of software/hardware, management negligence and artificial tampering. If the client is not able to detect corruption and tampering before using downloaded images, the potential security risks would result in a great loss.
Most existing work on integrity audit just assume the CSP to be untrusted or semi-trusted in their threat model. However, in cloud storage scenario, in order to get the compensation stipulated in SLA, a client (or the third party auditor appointed by the client) also has the motivation to falsify evidence to accuse an honest CSP of corrupting or tampering its outsourced data [10] . So as to cope with this security threat and settle the possible disputes, we introduce a watermark verification mechanism on the cloud side and employ a TPAR which is trusted by both the client and the CSP.
Similar as the third party auditor in existing public audit schemes [2] , [3] , the TPAR in our scheme also works honestly but curious about the content of clients' images. How to protect privacy from leaking to TPAR is a problem of great essential. In a typical verification scenario based on watermarking, the TPAR has to retrieve the content of image as well as watermark simultaneously and then regenerate the watermark based on the content to compare with the existing one. However, the leakage of client's image content towards TPAR should be prohibited. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing privacy preserving schemes can be applied directly to the proposed reversible watermarking based arbitration. Moreover, during the process of arbitration, a malicious prover may try to pass the verification by calculating the proof for corrupted images in advance. How to achieve resistance against such kind of replay attack is another issue to reconsider under the reversible watermarking based framework.
C. DESIGN GOALS
Considering the system model and threat model above, our scheme should achieve the following security and performance guarantees:
1. Efficient real-time auditability: to allow the client to check integrity of images once they are downloaded from the CSP and about to open. Since real-time audit is executed by the client itself, the proposed scheme must take the limited resources of clients into account and make use of the characteristics of images to achieve high efficiency and low overhead.
2. Privacy-preserving fair arbitration: to allow a third party arbitrator to fairly settle any dispute between the client and CSP without deriving any content of clients' images from the evidence collected during the process of arbitration. The arbitration scheme must achieve resistance against replay attack of the prover.
3. Non-destructive: to make sure our scheme would not introduce permanent corruption to images. That is to say, images downloaded from the cloud storage should be identical to original ones if there is no tampering or corruption caused by the CSP.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents our real-time integrity audit scheme with fair arbitration. We start from describing the idea of a reversible watermarking algorithm for images with stable capacity and Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme as preliminaries. Then, our real-time integrity audit scheme based on the proposed watermarking algorithm is proposed. Furthermore, we present an arbitration scheme and show how to achieve privacy-preserving support as well as replay attack resistance under the framework of reversible watermarking. Finally, we discuss the reason to choose BLS short signature and the proposed challenge-response mechanism.
A. PRELIMINARIES 1) ADAPTIVE REVERSIBLE WATERMARKING ALGORITHM
To prepare for an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme with privacy-preserving arbitration for images in cloud storage systems, we need such an adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm as preliminary. Firstly, the algorithm is adaptive so that the embedding capacity is stable for image blocks of the same size regardless of the content. In other words, by properly setting the size, each block could be embedded with authentication information of the fixed length. Secondly, the algorithm is reversible, which ensures the watermarked images in cloud storage can be fully recovered after the embedded authentication information is extracted if there is no tampering or corruption. That is to say, the availability of images is unaffected. In the following, we introduce the algorithm which consists of three procedures.
a: SETUP
Divide a grayscale image I into blocks of size 8×8 and transform each block into DCT coefficients. For simplicity, we just take a randomly selected block as an example to introduce the algorithm. In order to realize vulnerability, imperceptibility and stable capacity, we make use of fixed number of high frequency DCT coefficients to embed watermarking and the coefficients selected are shown in shaded area as in Fig. 2 .
For a 8 × 8 block, the high frequency DCT coefficients selected range from the 36th to the 63th and the total number is 28. We pick up them in zigzag-order before reordering into block of 4 × 7 shown in Fig. 3 . Let H be a matrix with size 4 × 7 stores the coefficients illustrated in the block shown in Fig. 3 . Each element in H is denoted as H (i, j), i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}.
First of all, we should find out the maximum and minimum of H as a = max{H (i, j)} i∈{1,2,3,4},j∈{1,2,...,7} and b = min{H (i, j)} i∈{1,2,3,4},j∈{1,2,...,7} , and record their positions respectively.
Define the difference between the maximum and the minimum as
And the median as
Before watermark embedding, we extend the maximum and the minimum values by adding and subtracting K respectively as
The ordering relation among a, b, K , mp, a , b has a clear geometric interpretation on the axis shown in Fig. 4 . It is worth mentioning that if there is more than one maximum or minimum in matrix H , we just only choose the first one encountered in the order from left to right, top to bottom, keep the other ones unchanged.
b: EMBEDDING ALGORITHM
2) In matrix H , find out the maximum value a and the minimum value b , both of which are used as flags to derive K thus no watermarking bits should be embedded in the corresponding positions.
3) Scan rows and columns of matrix H , for every element H (i, j) which is neither the maximum value nor the minimum value, check the to-be-embedded bit. If it is ''1'' and H (i, j) ≥ mp, the value is updated in the way as
While if the bit is ''1'' and H (i, j) < mp,
where α, which is greater than 1 and less than 2, is a factor to make sure H (i, j) greater than a but smaller than a , or smaller than b but greater than b , depending on the relationship between the value of H (i, j) and mp. If the to-be-embedded bit is ''0'', H (i, j) = H (i, j). By doing so, the embedding capacity for a block is always equal to the number of high frequency DCT coefficients used minus 2 because a maximum point and a minimum point are used as flags. Clearly, the capacity of such an embedding algorithm is 26 bits for every 8 × 8 grayscale image blocks. If the required payload to embed watermark bits is greater than 26 bits, more than one blocks need to be used.
c: EXTRACTING ALGORITHM
For a 8 × 8 watermarked image block, we first transform it into DCT domain and then present the extracting algorithm as follows:
1) Pick up its high frequency DCT coefficients and get the reordered matrix H with size 4 × 7.
2) In matrix H , find out the maximum value a and the minimum value b . Calculate K according to a and b in the way as follows:
3) Scan rows and columns of matrix H , once meet an element H (i, j), if it is the maximum value a , it is recovered to be
If it is the minimum value, then
Otherwise, when
' is extracted and the value of this point is recovered by setting
in which is a small value used to eliminate the error introduced by α. To achieve watermark extraction, we should have mp +
In this way, the watermark bits are extracted and the original image block can be restored without any distortion by transforming back recovered DCT coefficients.
2) DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE SCHEME
This scheme is proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [34] . Let p be a prime number and α a primitive root of Z p , both of which are public parameters. Each user i generates an independent random number X i chosen uniformly from {2, 3, . . . , p − 2} and keeps it secret. When i and j want to communicate with each other privately, user i calculates A = α X i mod p and sends to j, while at the same time j sends back B = α X j mod p. They obtain session key K ij by computing K ij = B X i mod p and K ij = A X j mod p, respectively. Of course, in this manner, K ij could be easily computed by both sides, but our opponents cannot obtain K ij even when security breaches expose A and B.
B. DEFINITIONS
Our proposed scheme consists of eight basic algorithms (KeyGen, WatermarkGen, WatermarkEmb, Commitment, Checking, GenChal, GenProof , VerifyProof ). KeyGen is a key generation algorithm run by the client to setup the scheme. WatermarkGen is to generate authentication watermark of the image which is signed by the client, while WatermarkEmb is to embed watermark. In our design, we make use of BLS short signatures [18] , rather than other signature schemes, such as RSA. The reason is discussed in Section III.D. Commitment is run by the CSP to verify whether the embedded watermark is a valid authentication information of the image. And the client runs Checking to check whether its downloaded images have been tampered or corrupted by CSP. If the result of Commitment or Checking is false, the TPAR gets involved in dealing with the dispute. It may generate a challenge by GenChal and ask the client or CSP who sparks the dispute to generate a proof of data storage correctness by running GenProof , which is verified by executing VerifyProof in the following. Running a real-time integrity audit scheme with fair arbitration consists of three phases, Setup, Integrity Verification and Arbitration.
1. Setup: The client initializes the public and secret parameters by running KeyGen, then preprocesses the image I by WatermarkGen to generate authentication information and embed by WatermarkEmb before outsourcing to CSP for storage. The CSP verifies whether the embedded watermark is a valid authentication information by Commitment. Once the result of verification is successful, it stores the received image locally and notifies the client to delete its local copy. Otherwise, it sends a response back to inform the client that its image has not been outsourced successfully and contacts the TPAR for arbitration.
Integrity Verification:
When the client receives an image from the CSP, it first verifies its integrity by Checking. Different from existing methods based on the challengeresponse, the client checks integrity by verifying the embedded digital signature, thus the CSP does not need to be involved in the audit process at all, which in turn eliminates the communication overhead of the proof information. Only when the result of Checking is true, the client begins to use the image. Otherwise, it resorts to the TPAR for arbitration.
Arbitration:
The TPAR verifies the correctness of watermark or the integrity of images in a challenge-response manner. It runs GenChal to issue an arbitration challenge including a randomly generated element to the client or CSP who sparks the dispute. The receiver generates a proof as response by executing GenProof which is verified by the TPAR via VerifyProof at a later time.
Our protocol uses the trusted TPAR, but only in a limited way: it is only needed once there is dispute between the client and the CSP. Thus in the vast majority of transactions, it is not involved at all.
C. REAL-TIME INTEGRITY AUDIT SCHEME WITH FAIR ARBITRATION
We propose a reversible watermarking based real-time integrity audit scheme with privacy-preserving fair arbitration support in this section. The proposed scheme is lightweight comparing with the state of art, on the ground that it completely eliminates communicational overhead and storage overhead for authentication information with the help of watermarking and reduces computation overhead for clients comparing with the existing real-time integrity audit schemes. In addition, the scheme achieves resistance of privacy leakage as well as replay attack under the reversible watermarking based framework.
1) SETUP
Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T a bilinear map. Let g be a generator of G 2 and H (·) a secure map-to-point hash function: {0, 1} * → G 1 , which maps strings to an element in G 1 .
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KeyGen(1 k ) → (pk, sk). Firstly, the TPAR chooses a large prime number p and sends to the CSP as well as clients who involved in the system. Then, the client takes the security parameter k as input, then chooses a primitive element α of Z p , a random x ← Z p , and computes v ← g x . The algorithm outputs a private key sk = x and a public key pk = (α, p, g, v) . The client stores sk locally and sends pk to the CSP and TPAR.
WatermarkGen(I ) → ({W i }, W ID ). Given an image I , the client divides it into non-overlapping blocks b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n ∈ Z p with same size. Then it generates two types of watermark for blocks and the whole image respectively. Type 1 watermark is designed for blocks. For a block b i , i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}, it is generated in the form as
where ID is an unique identity code for distinguishing image I and i is the index of block. Type 2 watermark is for the whole image, which is defined as
In (14), I R = I mod p, and I Q = I /p. Therefore, the output of the algorithm is the generated watermark set
According to the proposed adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm introduced in Section III.A, the embedding capacity for each 8 × 8 block is 26 bits. Considering the security requirements of signatures, the smallest size of block b i is set to be 32 × 32. The client embeds both types of watermarks into I successfully, where Type 1 watermark W i is embedded into b i itself and Type 2 watermark W ID is embedded in the first block. The watermarked image is outputted as I .
Commitment(I , pk) → {SUCCESS, FAILURE}. Once the watermarked image I is outsourced to the CSP for storage, this algorithm is run to check whether the embedded authentication information is correctly generated. The CSP extracts Type 2 watermark W ID and Type 1 watermark W i , i ∈ {1, 2 . . . , n} from I successfully by extracting algorithm presented in Section III.A to derive the recovered image signal I . Then it verifies whether W ID is correctly generated with the help of pk and I by checking
If so, the CSP can be sure that the signature is correctly generated by the client so that it re-embeds watermarks by WatermarkEmb and sends a message SUCCESS to notify the client to delete its local copy of outsourced images. Otherwise, it returns a message FAILURE to the client and contacts the TPAR for arbitration. According to the procedure above, if the watermarked image is stored in CSP, Type 2 watermark is considered to be correctly generated by the client, so that the client is prevented from maliciously accusing the CSP at a later time.
2) INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
To achieve real-time integrity verification, the solution is to have the client check its signed Type 2 watermark embedded in the image. If the result is false, it may further verify the correctness of Type 1 watermark of each block to locate the tampering or corruption and resort to the TPAR for fair arbitration.
Checking(I → ({i * })). To verify the integrity of downloaded image I from the CSP, the client first extracts Type 2 watermark W ID and Type 1 watermark W i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} from I successively and gets the recovered image I . W ID is verified by checking (15) once the client finishes extracting. If passed, the recovered image can be used directly. Otherwise, the client contacts the TPAR for arbitration and further locates which block is tampered or corrupted by verifying
for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Since Type 1 watermark is embedded into the corresponding block itself, once block b i * is corrupted, W i * is damaged simultaneously. Thus the checking of (16) would be failed for i * and the corruption is successfully located. Finally, the algorithm outputs the index set {i * } of corrupted blocks.
3) ARBITRATION
According to the above analysis, both the CSP and the client have the motive to cheat. On one hand, the CSP may modify the outsourced images of clients for its own benefits. On the other hand, since the generation and embedding of watermark are performed by the client, it potentially gives a dishonest client opportunity to falsely accusing an honest CSP. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a fair arbitration scheme to make sure neither the CSP nor the client have the ability to cheat without being detected.
An intuitive solution is based on signature exchange idea [10] , [13] to ensure the correctness of authentication information embedded in the outsourced images. Specifically, once the CSP receives a watermarked image from the client, it firstly extracts the watermark and verifies whether it is a valid signature on authentication information created by the private parameter of the client. If so, the CSP generates its own signature on the authentication information and embeds into the image. For the client, after downloading its outsourced image from the CSP, it first checks the validity of signature signed by the CSP. If it is incorrect, the signature exchange fails and the signature of the CSP is used as the evidence for its guilt. Otherwise, the signature exchange is considered successful and the exchanged signatures can be used for later dispute arbitration since they imply that an agreement has been reached on the authentication information. This intuitive solution, however, suffers from serious efficiency problem. Under such a solution, the latency of real-time integrity audit increases largely because the client needs to pay extra computation overhead for verifying the signature of CSP every time. As an improvement, we establish a simplified consensus mechanism, which completely avoids the signature of the CSP, thus the overhead for client to verify such a signature is eliminated. When the client outsources its images to the CSP for storage initially, the CSP runs Commitment to check whether the embedded watermark is a valid signature of the client on authentication information. Only when the result is true, it returns SUCCESS to the client and stores the watermarked image in its local storage. Otherwise, it sends back FAILURE and resorts to TPAR for arbitration. That is to say, once the CSP agrees to store the watermarked image without submitting for arbitration, it means it accepts the signature of the client and it must take responsibility whenever the image from its storage is detected to be tampered or corrupted from this moment on.
Clearly, there are two ways to trigger the process of arbitration, one is by the CSP when it finds that the embedded watermark is not correctly generated by the client, another is by the client once the result of real-time integrity audit is false. Under two circumstances, TPAR checks integrity of images by challenging the client and CSP respectively. The protocol is illustrated in Table 1 .
GenChal(pk) → (chal). To prevent replay attack, the TPAR picks a random element r ∈ Z p so that
And computes
which is necessary for later challenge. Furthermore, according to (17) , there must exists an s that satisfies
which is used in proof verification later. Finally, a challenge chal = (R, ID) is generated and sent to the prover who sparks the dispute. GenProof (I , chal) → (P). Once receiving the challenge, the client or CSP who arouses the dispute generates integrity proof in following steps. Firstly, it extracts Type 2 watermark W ID and Type 1 watermark W i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} from the challenged image whose identity code is ID. At the same time, the recovered image I is derived. Then the prover computes
and sends proof P = (W ID , A ID , I Q ) to TPAR. Since R is created based on random element r ∈ Z p chosen by the TPAR, the prover is not able to precompute A ID thus replay attack is prevented. VerifyProof (s, P) →{TRUE, FALSE}. Since in (19) , sr ≡ 1 mod (p − 1), there must exist an integer k so that
According to Fermat's little theorem, we have
Thus when the TPAR receives proof P from the prover, we can deduce that
That is to say, the feature of the challenged image can be extracted from A ID in a privacy preserving manner. Furthermore, the correctness of challenged image is verified by checking
Once the challenged image is tampered or corrupted, the TPAR returns FALSE and the prover must take responsibility. Otherwise, it outputs TRUE to terminate arbitration.
D. DISCUSSION
As mentioned above, our scheme is based on BLS short signature. The reason is that in the reversible watermarking based audit scheme, the embedding capacity for watermark is very limited. Specifically, for our proposed watermark algorithm, when the block size is 32 × 32, the capacity for each block is 416 bits. According to our protocol, each block should be embedded with 1 or 2 signatures, which is unrealistic for most frequently used signature schemes such as RSA and DSA. For example, when one uses a 1024-bit modulus, the length of an RSA signature is 1024 bits and DSA 320 bits, both of which exceed the capacity limit under block size 32 × 32.
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That is to say, if we choose them as the signature scheme in our protocol, the granularity of tampering detection would be definitely far outweigh 32 × 32. While for BLS signature scheme, when it provides comparable security level, its length is only restricted to 160 bits. Thus the granularity of 32 × 32 can be achieved.
In our proposed arbitration protocol, our design is different from traditional mechanism based on public verifiable homomorphic authenticators built from BLS signatures [18] , although we both verify the integrity of remote data by the challenge response protocol. In traditional mechanism, the challenger challenges a fixed number of data blocks at a time, which are then linearly combinated as one part of the proof. As another part, the corresponding authenticators are also aggregated by the prover. For blocks b i (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) whose authenticators are defined as {1, 2, . . . , n}) , the aggregated form of randomly selected c different authenticators can be denoted as σ = i∈I σ v i i ∈ G 1 , in which I = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s c } is a random c-element subset of set {1, 2, . . . , n} and v i (i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}) are randomly chosen by the challenger to prevent replay attack. However, we do not consider this aggregation-based mechanism a good choice. On one hand, it introduces exponential computing to clients every time they calculate a tag u b i for one block, which is a heavy computational burden for them whose computing power is limited. On the other hand, only when the number of aggregated blocks reaches a certain extent, this method is able to achieve high detection rate. For example, if a CSP modifies 1% blocks of an image I , the verifier needs to challenge 460 blocks of I at least in order to detect such a corruption with probability larger than 99%. That is to say, the client has to divide each image into more than 460 blocks and calculate their corresponding tags, which brings about unbearable computation overhead. Therefore, in our mechanism, we design two kinds of authentication information denoted by Type 1 watermark and Type 2 watermark respectively to lower the computational burden of clients. The latter one is calculated as W ID = H (ID, I Q , α I R mod p) x , in which α I R mod p is designed to achieve resistance to replay attack. Our design is different from traditional homomorphic authenticators in two aspects: 1. In order to support Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange based challenge-response scheme, in the definition of Type 2 watermark, α must be a primitive root of Z p , rather than a generator of G 1 , which is different from u in the BLS signature based homomorphic authenticator. 2. For supporting bilinear pairing based signature authentication, we should have W ID ∈ G 1 . Thus we set α I R mod p as the input of H (·), which maps strings to an element in G 1 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the security of our proposed scheme and arbitration protocol under the threat model defined in Section II.B. Following [3] and [17] , our analysis is based on both Computational Diffie-Hellman and Discrete Logarithm assumptions.
Theorem 1:
If a watermarked image passes the checking of Commitment by the CSP or Checking by the client, the embedded watermark must indeed be the signature of authentication information for the cover image created by the client.
Proof: Take Type 2 watermark for example and the case for Type 1 watermark can be proved similarly. It can be directly derived that the watermark which is actually the signature of client is unforgeable from the fact BLS signature scheme is secure [18] , that is to say, any adversary cannot forge a watermark for a modified image or a new cover image that has never been queried.
We then prove the theorem in random oracle model. Theorem 2: From the proof generated by the client or CSP who arouses the dispute, the TPAR is not able to infer the content of original image so that the proposed arbitration scheme is privacy-preserving.
Proof: According to our design, the proof generated by the client or CSP consists of two parts, the extracted Type 2 watermark and the DH protocol based exchanged information, which are denoted as P = (W ID , A ID ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Obviously, no information of original image can be learned from W ID according to the definition of Type 2 watermark. In the following we show that there exists no adversary who is able to derive any information of original image from A ID , where
Here TPAR is treated as the adversary. Since the adversary already has value of r, inferring I R is equivalent to solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): although given p, g and g rI R mod p, to compute rI R is still hard. Thus even though the adversary gets I Q and A ID , it still cannot learn I and Theorem 2 is proved.
Theorem 3: For the proposed arbitration scheme, the proof generated has the property of unforgeability and the scheme is able to resist replay attack.
Proof: For the generated proof, according to the proof of Theorem 1, W ID is unforgeable. And according to (25) , if the adversary tries to forge A ID to pass the verification, it must compute g rI R mod p. Even though the value of g I R mod p can be precomputed and stored by the adversary, the forgery of A ID is equivalent to solving the computational Diffie-Hellman problem: given p, g, g I R mod p and g r mod p, it is still difficult to compute g rI R mod p. Thus A ID is unforgeable.
On the other hand, since the challenge chal = (R, ID) is sent from the challenger to the adversary, where R = g r mod p is randomly chosen by the challenger. Due to the complexity of solving the discrete logarithm problem, it is impossible for the adversary to derive r from R. Thus our scheme is ensured to resist replay attack and the theorem is proved.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We take experiments in this section to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme for cloud images. Our auditing procedure is considered to be executed by the client itself and the arbitration mechanism happens between a dedicated TPAR and client or CSP who starts the dispute. In this section, we employ Amazon Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) instances to implement the process of CSP, which is able to provide storage service to clients. In addition, the client/TPAR side process is implemented on a workstation with Intel Core i5-4590 CPU @ 3.3GHz, 8GB RAM and a 7,200 RPM 1TB hard drive, which is separated from the CSP and has enough capabilities to handle concurrent tasks. All algorithms are implemented using pairing-based cryptography (PBC) library version 0.4.7 and the crypto library of OpenSSL version 1.0.2. To achieve 80-bit security parameter, |r| and |p| are set to be 80 and 160, respectively. We perform our experiments on two image datasets: Wang dataset [35] and Oxford5k dataset [36] , in which the first one contains 1000 low-resolution JPEG compressed images while the second one contains 5062 high-resolution images. All results are on the average of 20 tries.
A. WATERMARK COMPUTATION
During the setup phase of our scheme, we first divide an image into blocks and then generate Type 1 watermark and Type 2 watermark for each block and the whole image respectively, at last embed them into corresponding positions of the image instead of allocating storage space for them. For a grayscale image of size 512 × 512 bytes, when the block size is set to be 32 × 32 bytes, the image corresponds to 256 Type 1 watermark and 1 Type 2 watermark. According to our watermark generation formula For a grayscale image of size 1024 × 768 bytes, we first fragment it into multiple blocks of equal size (from 1KB to 128KB) and generate their watermarks, then embed these watermarks into the image itself, e.g., when block size is 4KB, the original image corresponds to 192 blocks, thus 192 Type 1 watermark and 1 Type 2 watermark. We compare the time costs of watermark generation for both types of watermarks in our scheme with that for the case of only using Type 2 watermark for blocks and the whole image, and the result is illustrated in Fig. 5 . It can be observed that when the size of blocks is small, especially less than 16 KB, the time cost decreases fast. This is because when the size is in this range, the number of blocks decreases sharply with the increment of block size. For the selected image, a smaller number of blocks implies less Type 1 watermarks to be generated, e.g., 2 KB fragmentation corresponds to 384 blocks, thus 384 Type 1 watermarks, while 8 KB fragmentation means 96 Type 1 watermarks. In contrast, if we use Type 2 watermark for blocks instead of Type 1 watermark, due to the extra exponentiation in Z p , the time cost of watermark generation is relatively greater, e.g., for block size of 2 KB, the cost increases by 15.22%. This explains why we use Type 1 watermark for blocks. Besides, the cost of the comparison mechanism is equivalent to that of tag computation in classic integrity audit mechanisms [2] , [3] , since all of them entail one hash computation and two modular exponentiations, which means our scheme saves the cost to generate authentication data. 6 shows the cost of watermark embedding in our scheme. We find the curve in this case is very close to that in Fig. 5 . The reason is that the number of Type 1 watermarks to be embedded is determined by the number of blocks in our scheme. For the same image, when the block size increases, VOLUME 7, 2019 the number of blocks decreases. This explains why embedding 2-KB blocks costs 1.005s while embedding 128-KB blocks costs only 0.907s. 
B. COST OF REAL-TIME AUDIT PROTOCOL
For real-time integrity audit, we test the cost of the client to execute the protocol, as illustrated in Fig. 7 . Referring to the figure, ''Non Real-time audit (Non RTA)'' means that we do not apply our real-time integrity audit scheme. ''Real-time audit with tampering localization'' represents our proposed scheme presented in Section III, while ''Realtime audit without tampering localization'' denotes that our scheme is without the embedding of Type 1 watermark. We find the curves of ''Non Real-time audit'' and ''Real-time audit without tampering localization'' are very close to each other. This is because in our scheme, the only cost of clients during the process of real-time audit is computation overhead for both real-time integrity auditing and read image operation. Compared with Non Real-time audit, our real-time audit scheme without tampering localization only requires the extraction of one Type 2 watermark, one hash computation with fixed-length input, one modular exponentiation in Z p as well as two more pairing computations. In our experiment, it takes about 37.3 to 68.9 ms to process a read operation for an image (30∼900 KB), comparing with 16.97 to 22.97 ms for real-time integrity auditing. Thus the difference between these two schemes is not significant. While for our scheme, when the precision of tampering localization is 32 × 32 bytes, 133.55 to 1000.8 ms are needed to extract both Type 1 and Type 2 watermark, as well as to prepare and execute pairing computation. It shows the scalability of our scheme.
We also compare the cost between our scheme and existing real-time audit scheme proposed by Hwang and Chen [12] . Considering tampering localization is not supported in Hwang's scheme, we achieve the comparison by our scheme without tampering localization. In Hwang's scheme, we set the height of FBHTree to be 15, which means to perform the real-time audit once, we need to execute 15 hash value computations in total and 2 times of hash value comparison. Referring to Table 2 , it takes about 70.5 to 244 ms for Hwang's scheme to perform a read operation for an image (30∼600 KB). Such kind of significant increase is because the computation overhead of hash value increases drastically with image size. While for our scheme, to read an image, we just need to extract both Type 1 and Type 2 watermark respectively, and then execute a verification operation based on bilinear pairing comparison. With block size fixed, the increasing of image size from 30 KB to 300 KB means more Type 1 watermark has to be extracted. Thanks to the lightweight of watermarking extraction, the time required increases slowly from 54.8 to 88.1 ms. To evaluate the speed of time increasing, in Table 2 we compare Our scheme/Non RTA and Hwang's scheme/Non RTA. Clearly, the result nearly remains monotonous for our scheme, while increases significantly for Hwang's scheme, which indicates the significant improvement. On the other hand, Hwang's scheme needs a synchronization server (SYS) to verify and store the signature of CSP, which is not necessary in our scheme. In addition, the storage overhead as well as communication overhead is non-negligible for Hwang's scheme [12] . For example, when the height of FBHTree is 15, the CSP has to allocate 2.1 MB memory space to store the tree. And for the client, it takes about 2 KB bandwidth to transfer the authentication data every time it downloads an image from the CSP. All these costs are completely eliminated in our scheme.
C. ARBITRATION EFFICIENCY
We estimate the arbitration efficiency on the basis of three basic phases: challenge generation, proof generation and proof verification. During the process of arbitration, we quantify the cost in terms of arbitrator computation, prover computation as well as communication overhead. The arbitrator involves in the first and the third phases, thus its computation overhead includes two exponentiations R = α r ∈ Z p , X ID = A s ID = α I R ∈ Z p , a hash computation H (ID, X ID ) ∈ G 1 and two pairing computations. As a comparison, the existing PDP scheme [2] entails a hash computation in Z p , a multiplication in G T , c + 1 multiplications in G 1 , c + 3 exponentiations in G 1 , c hash computations in G 1 as well as two pairing computations, in which c is the number of challenged blocks every time. For a file which has been divided into blocks and outsourced to cloud storage, if the CSP has deleted 1% of the blocks, in order to detect the misbehavior with probability greater than 99%, the value of c should be at least 460 [1] . Thus their extra cost on the third party auditor would be non-negligible against that on the arbitrator in our scheme.
On the prover side, the computation overhead comes from proof generation. We consider our scheme only embedded with a Type 2 watermark here since tampering localization is not supported by our comparator [2] . Thus the corresponding computation cost is due to the extraction of a Type 2 watermark and an exponentiation A ID = R I R ∈ Z p . While for the prover in [2] , it has to do an exponentiation in G T , a hash computation in Z p , c + 1 multiplications in Z p and a c-term exponentiations in G 1 . In addition, since the response of the prover in [2] contains an additional random element R ∈ G T , the scheme has an extra 960 bits communication cost than our scheme. The result of efficiency comparison between our scheme and [2] is listed in Table 3 . 
D. IMPERCEPTIBILITY OF AUTHENTICATION DATA
We evaluate the imperceptibility of authentication data from the subjective and objective aspects. A low-resolution image with size 256 × 384 and a high-resolution image with size 1024 × 768 are chosen in this part. Once the block size is set to be 32 × 32, the original images and watermarked ones are presented in Figs. 8 (a), (b) , (c), (d) respectively.
It is obvious that the watermarked images are not significantly different from the original ones even if in the worst case that the block size is 32 × 32. We further quantize the imperceptibility of authentication data in terms of the lower bound of the PSNR of watermarked images generated by our proposed adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm versus the original image and the results are shown in Table 4 and  Table 5 , respectively. It is clearly observed that the PSNR of low-resolution image is greater than 28.5 dB and that of high-resolution image is greater than 37.66 dB, both of which are under the block size of 32 × 32. To the best of our knowledge, such lower bounds are comparable to other reversible watermarking algorithms and the imperceptibility is achieved. With the increase in block size, the number of blocks for both images drops from 96 to 6 and 768 to 48, respectively, which means the number of Type 1 watermark reducing accordingly, thus results in the decreasing of pure payload and increasing of PSNR. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient real-time integrity audit scheme with privacy-preserving arbitration for images in cloud storage system. We utilize the proposed adaptive reversible watermarking algorithm to achieve lightweight real-time integrity audit scheme with tampering localization in cloud storage, which not only alleviates the computation overhead of clients and makes it possible to realize real-time audit on client side, but also completely eliminates communication overhead and storage overhead for authentication data. With the help of reversible watermarking, the content of the image would be recovered to the original state once the watermark is extracted thus non-destructive is assured. Furthermore, we adopt Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme to realize fair arbitration under the reversible watermarking based real-time integrity audit mechanism, which achieves resistance against replay attack from the prover and privacy-preserving guarantee simultaneously. Our security analysis and experiments further demonstrate the security and high performance of our proposed scheme for images in cloud storage system, whose overhead for both real-time audit and fair arbitration are controllable.
